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US Iraq Intelligence Summary - Iran - COA Scimitar - Muqtada Al Sadr - Mahdi Militia (June 3, 2006)

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Release date
May 16, 2008

Summary

US Iraq INTSUM (Intelligence Summary) from al-Hillah, dated June 3, 2006 and written at the SECRET/NOFORN level. Verified by Wikileaks editorial staff.

Acronym expansions useful to read the document:

REL: Relative
MCFI: Multi-Coalition Force Iraq
MNF-I; Multi-National Force - Iraq
CF: Coalition Forces
MM: Mahdi Militia
MR: Manual Review
U: Unclassified
S: Secret
NOFORN: No Foreign access
MND: Multi-National Division

Text version follows. The linked file remains authoritative.


SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI

REO AL HILLAH, IRAQ

2006 JUNE 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

COA Scimitar continues to be heavily influenced by Iranian entities, particularly SCIRI and BADR Corps. Iranian sympathizers and proponents from the SCIRI Governor SALIM SALIH MAHDI AL MUSLIMAWI and many of his cabinet members continue to perpetuate sectarian policy and steer gubernatorial decisions. This present political climate proves tenuous for neutral, non-sectarian leadership such as GEN Qais Hamza Abood Al-Mamori, the Babil provincial chief of police. MOI reconfiguration coupled with militia infiltration and influence constantly pose a threat to his tenure. Recently, twenty three council members threatened to conduct a fifteen day walk out on the Provincial Council (PC) because of Qais’ continuance as the chief of police. Additionally, as ISF take the lead in securing Babil Province; armed groups such as Mahdi Militia compete with them, desiring to become a legitimate alternative for the public. As the coalition force footprint has decreased significantly in southern Babil, AIF freedom of movement will be more prevalent unless IA and IP forces’ patrolling and operations are significantly improved.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

On 2 May at approximately 2250 hours, there was an IDF attack against the Regional Embassy Office (REO), Al Hillah. It is assessed that one 82mm mortar and one 107mm rocket were fired from northwest of the compound. The POI for the rocket was MA463986. QRF was dispatched the next morning based on a Hillah Home Guard sighting of a Chinese rocket. The rocket landed at MA 452980, and was embedded approximately nine feet into the ground. Iraqi ISF used a back hoe to unearth it, and Kalsu EOD detonated it on site.

COMMENT: Two projectiles were fired last year at the REO during this time frame, and the attackers were never apprehended. It is not known whether the same individuals are responsible. This attack may be in response to the vehicular accident and accidental shooting of a LN the same day by a US civilian PSD contracting team just on the other side of the Al Hillah river north of Camp Charlie. There are no counter fire acquisition systems at the REO; therefore POO verification is not likely.

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING:

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-139 SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-139

SUMMARY: (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) MAHDI MILITIA MEMBERS ARE CONDUCTING NIGHTLY MEETINGS IN THE AL ASKERI NEIGHBORHOOD OF AL KIFIL. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ARE FOR THE PLANNING OF AN AMBUSH AGAINST COALITION FORCES.

1. (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) MAHDI MILITIA MEMBERS ARE CONDUCTING NIGHTLY MEETINGS IN AN UNKOWN LOCATION WITHIN THE AL ASKERI NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCOORD:38SMA4166//, OF AL KIFIL //MGRSCOORD:38SMA4065//, IZ.

2. (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) THE MEETINGS ARE USUALLY CONDUCTED AT 2130 TO 2300 HLT, BY SATAR ((JABBAR)) AND THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS ARE FOR THE PLANNING OF AN AMBUSH AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION (FIELD COMMENT – LOCATION AND DATE OF AMBUSH IS UNKOWN) NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

3. (S//REL TO USA, MCFI) ALSO ATTENDING THESE MEETINGS ARE KARAR ((JABBAR)), SAYED MUTHANA MNU LNU, SAYED DAKHAL ((SAAD)), MAHDI MNU LNU, AND HASSAN MNU LNU, (NFI) WHICH ARE ALL LOCAL MAHDI MILITIA LEADERS.

COMMENT: Previous reports have detailed plans by armed groups to attack patrols along ASR Latina, particularly in Al Kifil and its surrounding areas. The most likely targets would be logistical patrols enroute with LOGPAC during hours of limited visibility.


SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-140/ LEADERS OF MAHDI MILITIA ARE MEETING NIGHTLY TO PLAN AMBUSHES AGAINST COALITION FORCES.

SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA MEMBERS, SATAR AND KARAR JABBAR, RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF WEAPONS ON 01 JUNE 2006, AT THEIR RESIDENCE IN THE AL ASKERI NEIGHBORHOOD OF AL KIFIL. THE WEAPONS SHIPMENT CONSISTED OF AK-47 RIFLES, RPG-7 LAUNCHERS, RPG ROCKETS, AND AN UNIDENTIFIED TYPE OF RIFLES.

1. (S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA MEMBERS, SATAR ((JABAR)) AND KARAR ((JABBAR)) RECEIVED A SHIPMENT OF WEAPONS ON 01 JUNE 2006, AT THEIR RESIDENCE (CNA) WITHIN THE AL ASKERI NEIGHBORHOOD //MGRSCOORD:38SMA4166//, OF AL KIFIL //MGRSCOORD:38SMA4065//, IZ. THESE TYPES OF DELIVERIES HAVE HAPPENED TWO TO THREE TIMES WITHIN A SIX TO SEVEN DAY PERIOD.

2. (S//NOFORN) THE WEAPONS SHIPMENT CONSISTED OF AK-47 RIFLES, RPG-7 LAUNCHERS, RPG ROCKETS, AND AN UNIDENTIFIED TYPE OF RIFLES. THE WEAPONS WERE DELIVERED IN FIVE LIGHT BROWN SACKS THAT MEASURED APPROXIMATELY 105 CENTIMETERS TALL AND 60 CENTIMETERS WIDE (FIELD COMMENT -- THE SOURCE DESCRIBED THE SACKS AS MADE OF CLOTH AND THE COLOR OF CARDBOARD).

3. (S//NOFORN) SATAR AND KARAR UNLOADED THE WEAPONS FROM A BLUE, 2 DOOR, KIA COUPE, MID 90’S MODEL, BABIL LICENSE PLATE NUMBER 15640, THAT APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD CONDITION. AFTER OFF LOADING THE WEAPONS, SATAR AND KARAR CARRIED THE SACKS INTO THEIR RESIDENCE. AFTER APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR, FOUR UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS SHOWED UP AND CARRIED AWAY THREE TO FOUR SACKS IN A GREEN PASSENGER VAN, NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

COMMENT:

The actions of the Jabar brothers indicate a concerted network of insurgents which are transporting direct fire weapons for attacks in other areas of Iraq, or most likely in the vicinity of Al Kifil. The quantity of these weapons indicate a significant threat to CF/ISF operating or passing through the town, most likely in the form of complex attacks initiated either by an IED or RPG fire.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-141 SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-141/ MAHDI MILITIA CELL PLAN TO MOVE A WEAPONS CACHE OUT OF AL KIFIL.

SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN) A MAHDI MILITIA INSURGENT OPERATIONS CELL WILL MOVE AN UNIDENTIFIED WEAPONS CACHE ON 4 OR 5 JUNE 2006, TO AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THE CELL HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY STORING WEAPONS IN AL KIFIL.

1. (S//NOFORN) A MAHDI MILITIA INSURGENT OPERATIONS CELL WILL MOVE AN UNIDENTIFIED WEAPONS CACHE ON 4 OR 5 JUNE 2006, TO AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THE CELL HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY STORING WEAPONS IN AL KIFIL //MGRSCOORD:38SMA4065//, IZ NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

A MAHDI MILITIA INSURGENT OPERATIONS CELL WILL MOVE AN UNIDENTIFIED WEAPONS CACHE ON 4 OR 5 JUNE 2006, TO AN UNDISCLOSED LOCATION. THE CELL HAS BEEN TEMPORARILY STORING WEAPONS IN AL KIFIL.

COMMENT: This report correlates to the previous two reports detailing armed group meetings and coordinated weapon cache transports in the Kifl area, particulary by Satar and Karar Jabar.


SERIAL: (U) DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-142 SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-142/ MAHDI MILITIA RUNNING AN AGGRESSIVE INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN AGAINS ANYONE WORKING WITH COALITION FORCES.

SOURCE: (S//NOFORN) //OTS-X-XXX-XXXX-XX// A HIGH RANKING XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX WITHIN THE MAHDI MILITIA WITH DIRECT ACCESS TO THE REPORTED INFORMATION BY VIRTUE OF PERSONAL OBSERVATION. CONTEXT STATEMENT -- SOURCE MOTIVATION FOR REPORTED INFORMATION IS THE DESIRE TO SEE RADICAL MAHDI MILITIA MEMBERS STOP THE INSURGENCY AND MONETARY. SOURCE AND SUBSOURCE RELIABILITY HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED.


SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA IS CURRENTLY RUNNING A VERY AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ANYONE HELPING OR COOPERATING WITH COALITION FORCES. UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN BEATEN, TORCHURED, AND KILLED FOR BEING SUSPECTED OF HELPING COALITION FORCES.

(S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA IS CURRENTLY RUNNING A VERY AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ANYONE HELPING OR COOPERATING WITH COALITION FORCES. UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN BEATEN, TORCHURED, AND KILLED FOR BEING SUSPECTED OF HELPING COALITION FORCES.

(S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA IS DRIVING THIS INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN IN RESPONSE TO MAHDI MILITIA RECEIVING INFORMATION FROM UNIDENTIFIED LOCAL IRAQI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, THAT HIGH RANKING MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA WERE BEING TARGETED BY U.S. FORCES IN MAY OF 2006.

(S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA IS UTILIZING UNIDENTIFIED IRAQI POLICE, ARMY, AND TAXI CAB DRIVERS TO REPORT ON WHO IS ENTERING AND LEAVING U.S. AND COALITION FORWARD OPERATING BASES.

COMMENT:

One THT 809 source nearly escaped an assassination attempt recently due to compromise by ISF working with AIF who released his identity. As MM and other armed groups continue these aggressive tactics, HUMINT operations will be severely degraded. CF must exercise the utmost caution in safeguarding these sources as well as individuals working on U.S. bases.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-143 SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-143/ IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE, THROUGH MAHDI MILITIA AND BADR CORPS, ARE TARGETING TACTICAL HUMINT TEAMS AND SPECIAL FORCES

SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN) IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE, THROUGH MAHDI MILITIA AND BADR CORPS, ARE CURRENTLY TARGETING TACTICAL HUMINT TEAMS AND SPECIAL FORCES ELEMENTS. THE CAPTURE OR KILLING OF TACTICAL HUMINT TEAM OR SPECIAL FORCES MEMBERS IS REWARDABLE IN THE AMOUNT OF 15O,OOO DOLLARS U.S.

(S//NOFORN) IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE, THROUGH MAHDI MILITIA AND BADR CORPS, ARE CURRENTLY TARGETING TACTICAL HUMINT TEAMS (THT) AND SPECIAL FORCES (SF) ELEMENTS.


(S//NOFORN) IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WANT TO KNOW WHAT THT, AND SF MEMBERS ARE WORKING IN SOUTHERN IRAQ. THE CAPTURE OR KILLING OF THT OR SF MEMBERS IS REWARDABLE IN THE AMOUNT OF 15O,OOO DOLLARS U.S. MAHDI MILITIA IS ALSO TARGETING MARINES WORKING AT CAMP DUKE //MGRSCOORD: 38SMA1458//, IZ

(S//NOFORN) MAHDI MILITIA IS UTILIZING UNIDENTIFIED IRAQI POLICE, ARMY, AND TAXI CAB DRIVERS TO REPORT ON WHO IS ENTERING AND LEAVING U.S. AND COALITION FORWARD OPERATING BASES.

COMMENT: Individuals claiming to possess information on insurgents have recently approached CF compounds IOT identify THT and special operations soldiers. Attempts by these organizations have even attempted to photograph these individuals on the FOBs/compounds. Such bold attempts to target the soldiers indicate the enemy’s realization of these soldiers’ value to operations, and their role as combat multipliers. Special, unconventional considerations for their force protection and anonymity must always be considered in mission planning.

SERIAL: (U) DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-144 SUBJ: DIIR-4ID-35-809-06-144/APPROXIMATELY 40 MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA, LEAVE MAHDI MILITIA AND JOIN AL SARKHI

SUMMARY: (S//NOFORN) APPROXIMATELY 40 UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA, LEFT MAHDI MILITIA AND JOINED HUSSEINIE AL SARKHI. THE MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA DECIDED TO LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION BECAUSE THEY FELT MUQTADA AL SADR WAS TOO TOLERANT AND WEAK TOWARDS THE FOREIGN OCCUPIERS.

(S//NOFORN) APPROXIMATELY 40 UNIDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA, LEFT MAHDI MILITIA AND JOINED HUSSEINIE ((AL SARKHI)). THE MEMBERS OF MAHDI MILITIA DECIDED TO LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION BECAUSE THEY FELT MUQTADA ((AL SADR)) WAS TOO TOLERANT AND WEAK TOWARDS THE FOREIGN OCCUPIERS; HUSSENIE ON THE OTHER HAD IS TOUGH AND BRAVE WHEN FACING THE AMERICAN DEVILS. NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

COMMENT: The past several months have chronicled certain pockets of Mahdi Militia members becoming increasingly more intolerant of Muqtada Al Sadr’s political dealings. These dissatisfied factions have called for a more kinetic, violent approach. These demands have been quelled by Sadr, who has only allowed his most disciplined Special Forces companies to engage Coalition Forces via mainly indirect fire confrontations, then breaking contact. Expect more MM members to splinter off and conduct independent, unsanctioned attacks against CF, or to join other more dynamic groups.

SECRET//REL TO USA, MCFI

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United States
Military or intelligence (ruling)
US Department of Defense
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SHA256 2df353c2c73ff3922cb60ee30b47a451828d622e547ee5a230ef618cbe3a47bf


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